Credit Crunch: The End of the Beginning?
The economic slowdown is a year old, but the Bank of England warns it may “linger on for some respectable time”
by Sean O’Grady
Here’s some “big picture” numbers on the state of the universe’s monetary system. According to ING, the total value of estate written down by Planet Earth’s big banks is $502bn. The total value of capital raised by dint of. the same: $351bn. That deficit, of $151bn could easily get a great deal of much bigger. No awe the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Charlie Bean, said the other day that the slowdown may “draw without interruption for some considerable time”, while the IMF has called it “the largest financial conflict since the Great Depression”.
Now, shortly after the unhappy first birthday of the credit crunch we are at what we might call “the end of the beginning”. Even though Ken Rogoff, a former chief economist at the IMF, has chillingly warned that a “whopper” greater bank pleasure go under in the next few months, at least we know the rough parameters of the sub-prime problem—usually neatly and memorably rounded to in all parts of $1 trillion ($1,000bn). It may even be a little superior than that: house prices are still falling in the United States, if it be not that mostly at a gentler pace. So some of the gloom may be lifting over there.
What’s nearest? Well, in that place are sum of two units new looming threats to maintain us awake at night. First, the certainty that that which one might term the “usual” writedowns and losses associated with one economic downturn will add to the strains on banks’ balance sheets just when they are at their weakest.
In the UK, we know these are on the rise because some banks have already declared such difficulties; because of the rising trend of redundancies, arrears and repossessions; because of the collapse in sentiment in the protection market and because the first-round effects of the credit crunch are now creating their own second-round effects, through the “mortgage scarcity of food” for first-time buyers, the main source of new funding to the residential property market.
That, by the way, is now being exacerbated by a fall in demand for new mortgages from those same first-time buyers, who judge that a falling market is one where they can afford to rent, wait and see. No matter, though; the picture is one where other people will catch it more difficult to service their debts, from credit cards to car loans and mortgages, the banks will have to wait longer for their money and may see some of it lost for good.
Which brings us to the second nightmare. Will the banks be accomplished to raise the capital required for them to recover their strength during the time that losses mount? Now for the banks what we’ve seen is rather take pleasure in suffering from a detrimental instance of flu (sub-prime) and then catching a cold (normal downturn losses) in succession top. Result: financial pneumonia. For which the well-known cure is plenty of liquidness fed to the system by assiduous central banks (see the Bank of England’s manifest Special Liquidity Scheme among other miracle cures) and a strong course of capital injections.
The latter is proving steadily more tricky to administer, as we see from those big numbers I quoted at the beginning and from the rights issue flops at HBOS and Bradford & Bingley, in the midst of others. It has been a hard-working oppress fair to raise the &bruise;20bn the British banks have now garnered concerning their balance sheets. The team at Capital Economics calculates that £65bn more is needed in the way of fresh excellent, that is if the banks are to carry on functioning at their current rates of lending and to arrange out the remaining damage from the credit crunch.
Alternatively, the banks could simply reduce their lending. But that would mean an but also bigger fern on produce than we have seen so well-nigh. Capital Economics says that as being the banks to reclaim their comparative estimate sheets in this extent would imply a reduction in lending of £440bn (17 per cent of the balance sheet), a truly terrifying sum. Some mixture of the two seems more likely, further even that has some nasty consequences.
If the banks manage to raise another &shut up;20bn from disposals, conventional rights issues, Sovereign Wealth Funds in China and the Gulf subscribing for equity, and venture building and takeovers by foreign banks relatively unscathed from the mess (e.g., Banco Santander/Alliance & Leicester), this would still mean a contraction in balance sheets of £180bn, or 7 per cent—equivalent to 13 per cent of the UK’s GDP. I cursory reference that just to illustrate the flake of the phenomenon, and is not meant to be a read off for the wider economic effects. Much of the contraction in lending will hit foreign entities, and bank credit is not the only source of expenditure in the thrift. That is, despite appearances in recent years; more rebalancing away from our reliance adhering debt to money growth is overdue and welcome, however it will be painful.
However, if UK bank lending drops by just 5 per cent, that disposition easily be enough to tip the economy into recession. Capital Economics says that it would intend business investment also down by 7 by cent, that covering market mode of action would “grind to a halt” by a 50 per cent very little in prices, and consumer spending down through 1.4 for cent, shaving 0.6 per cent off growth per annum, where it is already expected to be stagnant. We last saw real terms lending by the banks avail negative in the mid 1970s—not a happy precedent. So recession here we arrive.
Is there a distance out? Well, things may not turn wanting to be as unwholesome as the pessimists anticipate. But a third option, not up to the banks but-end turn to account to the regulators, internationally, would be to ease the banks’ capital requirements, altering the ratios to allow them to lend more on thinner capital, so-called “contrariwise cyclical” regulatory action. Risky, perhaps, excepting maybe again welcome than their fourth option, of direct state intervention to preserve lending. That, we be possible to confidently say might spring be the beginning of the extreme point.
